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1 Introduction
The largest food assistance program in the United States, the Food Stamp Program is . . . the most critical
component of the safety net against hunger (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1999, p.7).While this program
provides basic protection for citizens of all ages and household status, the safety net is especially important
for children who comprise over half of all recipients (Cunnyngham and Brown, 2004). Given the cornerstone
role of food stamps in ensuring food security, policymakers have been puzzled to observe that food stamp
households appear more likely to be food insecure than observationally similar nonparticipating eligible
households.
In response to a burgeoning interest in food insecurity, an extensive literature has developed in the
last decade on the determinants and consequences of food insecurity in the United States.1 The negative
association between food security and food stamp participation has been ascribed to several factors including
self-selection based on unobserved household characteristics, the timing of food insecurity versus food stamp
receipt, misreporting of food insecurity status, and misreporting of food stamp receipt. Previous work has
studied these rst two issues (e.g., Gundersen and Oliveira, 2001; Wilde and Nord, 2005; Nord et al., 2004).
The literature has not assessed the consequences of measurement error.
We focus on measurement error issues using data from the Core Food Security Module (CFSM), a
component of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Specically, we investigate what can be inferred when
food stamp participation and food insecurity status may be misreported. As elaborated below, we extend the
econometric literature on misclassied binary variables by studying identication when an outcome (in our
case food insecurity) and a conditioning variable (food stamp participation) are both subject to arbitrary
endogenous classication error. We also consider the identifying power of assumptions that restrict the
patterns of classication errors. For example, misreported food insecurity status might arise independently
of true food stamp participation status. We propose a computationally e¢ cient estimation algorithm for this
orthogonal errorscase. We also consider cases involving asymmetric reporting errors. As is well understood
in the econometrics literature, even random errors can lead to seriously biased parameter estimates.
A number of studies have documented the presence of substantial reporting error in householdsreceipt of
1For other recent work see, e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Bitler et al., 2005; Borjas, 2004; Dunifon and Kowaleski-
Jones, 2003; Furness et al., 2004; Gundersen et al., 2003; Laraia et al., 2006; Ribar and Hamrick, 2003; and Van Hook
and Balistreri, 2006.
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food stamp benets. For example, using administrative data matched with data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP), Marquis and Moore (1990) found that about 19 percent of actual food
stamp recipient households reported that they were not recipients. Underreporting of up to 25 percent has
also been documented in comparisons between responses in surveys, such as the CPS, and administrative
data (Cunnyngham, 2005). Bollinger and David (1997, 2001, 2005) estimate econometric models of food
stamp response errors and study the consequences of misreporting for inference on take-up rates.
The assumption of fully accurate reporting of food insecurity status can also be questioned. Even in
anonymous surveys, some food stamp recipients might misreport being food insecure if they believe that to
report otherwise could jeopardize their eligibility.2 Alternatively, some parents might misreport being food
secure if they feel ashamed about heading a household in which their children are not getting enough food
to eat (Hamelin et al., 2002). More generally, some of the survey questions used to calculate o¢ cial food
insecurity status (see Section 2) require the respondent to make a subjective judgment. Validation studies
consistently reveal large degrees of response error in survey data for a wide range of self-reports, even for
relatively objective variables (see, e.g., Black et al., 2003). Moreover, timing issues in the comparison of food
insecurity status against the receipt of food stamps can further confound identication.
In this paper, we study what can be known about food insecurity status conditional on food stamp
participation when both variables may be misreported. The econometric component of the paper extends
the literature on misclassied binary variables (e.g., Aigner, 1973; Bollinger, 1996; Bollinger and David, 1997,
2001; Frazis and Loewenstein, 2003; Kreider and Pepper, forthcoming a,b). Our nonparametric framework
follows the spirit of Horowitz and Manski (1995) who study partial identication under corrupt samples given
minimal assumptions on the error generating process.3 Within this environment, we derive sharp worst-case
bounds on conditional food insecurity rates that exploit all available information under the maintained
assumptions.
To isolate the identication problem associated with potentially misreported food stamp participation,
we begin by assuming that the food insecurity outcome is reported without error. First, we present sharp
bounds derived in Kreider and Pepper (forthcoming, a) that impose no assumptions on the patterns of
2Other literatures contain lively debates about the extent to which self-reported disability might be inuenced by
a respondents desire to rationalize labor force withdrawal or the receipt of disability benets (see, e.g., Bound and
Burkhauser, 1999).
3For extensions of their nonparametric approach, see, for example, Hotz et al. (1997), Pepper (2000), Dominitz
and Sherman (2004), Molinari (2005), and Kreider and Pepper (forthcoming a).
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classication errors in a conditioning variable. Next, we derive narrower sets of bounds for two benchmark
cases that impose structure on the reporting error process. In Proposition 1, we consider the identifying
power of an assumption that food stamp participation is potentially underreported but households do not
falsely claim to receive food stamps. In Proposition 2, we introduce easy-to-compute sharp bounds for the
case that food stamp misreporting arises independently of true participation status (orthogonal errors). For
these bounds, we show how to transform a computationally expensive multidimensional search problem into
a series of single-dimension search problems that requires little programming e¤ort or computational time.
After studying the identication problem for the case of fully accurate food insecurity responses, we consider
the case that food insecurity as well as food stamp participation may be reported with error.4
In the next section, we describe the central variables of interest in this paper food insecurity and food
stamps followed by a description of the CFSM data. In Section 3, we highlight the statistical identication
problem created by the potential unreliability of the self-reported data. We then show how conditional food
insecurity prevalence rates can be partially identied under various restrictions on the nature and degree of
classication errors. Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Concepts and Data
2.1 Food Insecurity
The extent of food insecurity in the United States has become a well-publicized issue of concern to poli-
cymakers and program administrators. In 2003, 11:2% of the U.S. population reported that they su¤ered
from food insecurity at some time during the previous year. As described below, these households were
uncertain of having, or unable to acquire, enough food for all their members because they had insu¢ cient
money or other resources. For about 3:5% of the population, the degree of food insecurity was severe enough
to be recorded as food insecurity with hunger. For households with children, the reported levels were higher:
16:7% and 3:8%, respectively.
To calculate the o¢ cial food insecurity rates in the U.S., dened over a 12 month period, a series of 18
questions are posed in the CSFM for families with children.5 Each question is designed to capture some aspect
of food insecurity and, for some questions, the frequency with which it manifests itself. Examples include I
4 In contrast to our nonparametric approach, Hausman et al. (1998) propose parametric and semiparametric
estimators in a discrete-response regression setting that allow for misclassication in a dependent variable.
5For families without children and for one-person households, a subset of 10 questions are posed.
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worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more(the least severe outcome); Did
you or the other adults in your household ever cut the size of your meals or skip meals because there wasnt
enough money for food?and Did a child in the household ever not eat for a full day because you couldnt
a¤ord enough food?A household with children is categorized as (a) food secure if the respondent responds
a¢ rmatively to two or fewer of these questions, (b) food insecure if the respondent responds a¢ rmatively
to three or more questions, and (c) food insecure with hunger if the respondent responds a¢ rmatively to
eight or more questions.6 A complete listing of the food insecurity questions is presented in Table 1. Figure
1 provides the frequency of a¢ rmative responses to each of the 18 CFSM questions for each food insecurity
category (food secure, food insecure without hunger, and food insecure with hunger).
The CFSM questions are designed to portray food insecurity in the United States in a manner consistent
with how experts perceive the presence of food insecurity. Given conceptual di¢ culties in quantifying food
insecurity status, its measurement contains both objective and subjective components.7 Such classications
are thus akin to classications of work disability in that work capacity involves both objective factors (e.g.,
the presence of a medical condition) and subjective factors (e.g., the ability to function e¤ectively despite
the presence of the condition).8 For reasons described above, a households food insecurity status might be
misclassied relative to the professions intended threshold for true food insecurity.
The ordered nature of some of the CFSM food insecurity questions provides a limited check on the
consistency of the responses. For example, Child skipped meal(item #16) is arguably more severe than
Child was hungry (#14), which in turn is arguably more severe than Child not eating enough (#9).
Moreover, Child skipped meal(s) for three or more months (#17)and Child did not eat for whole day
(#18) are more severe than the preceding items, though #17 and #18 are not ordered themselves given
a potential tradeo¤ between intensity and duration of hunger. Pervasive inconsistencies in responses to
ordered questions would presumably heighten concerns about the reliability of the household food insecurity
indicators.
6 In 1996, the label food insecurity with hunger was changed to very low food security status. Despite this
change in nomenclature, the methods used to dene households are identical under the two names. We treat food in-
security as a binary indicator in this paper consistent with how it is generally dened by researchers and policymakers.
We do not attempt to address conceptual issues about how food insecurity should be ideally quantied.
7Consistent with the subjective nature of the questions in the CFSM, Gundersen and Ribar (2005) nd that self-
reported food insecurity has a substantially higher correlation with a subjective measure of food expenditure needs
than with an objective measure of such needs.
8See, for example, Bound and Burkhauser (1999).
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To investigate inconsistency rates, we propose the following sets of orderings: f9; 14; 16; 17g and f9; 14; 16; 18g
(child skipped meals), f5; 8; 15g and f5; 13; 15g (adults skipped meals), and f7; 10; 11g (respondent did not
eat enough). There might be additional reasonable orderings, but we conservatively focus on the most ob-
vious cases. Based on these sets, we nd at least one inconsistency for 6:1% of the sample. Most of these
inconsistencies are concentrated on questions pertaining to adult members of the household; for the questions
about children, the inconsistency rate is only about 1%. Of course, the presence (or absence) of such incon-
sistencies does not by itself confer knowledge about the reliability of a households aggregate food insecurity
classication. Food insecurity can be misclassied even if the household always reports consistently, and the
presence of inconsistencies is not necessarily pivotal in determining the aggregate outcome. Still, we have
reason to question the reliability of 6:1% of the responses even before considering the other aforementioned
sources of potential classication error.
2.2 The Food Stamp Program
The Food Stamp Program, with a few exceptions, is available to all families with children who meet income
and asset tests. To receive food stamps, households must meet three nancial criteria: a gross-income test,
a net-income test, and an asset test. A households gross income before taxes in the previous month cannot
exceed 130 percent of the poverty line, and net monthly income cannot exceed the poverty line.9 Finally,
income-eligible households with assets less than $2,000 qualify for the program. The value of a vehicle
above $4,650 is considered an asset unless it is used for work or for the transportation of disabled persons.
Households receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and households where all members
receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are categorically eligible for food stamps and do not have to
meet these three tests.
A large fraction of households eligible for food stamps do not participate. This outcome is often ascribed
to three main factors. First, there may be stigma associated with receiving food stamps. Stigma encompasses
a wide variety of sources, from a persons own distaste for receiving food stamps to the fear of disapproval
from others when redeeming food stamps to the possible negative reaction of caseworkers (Ranney and
9Net income is calculated by subtracting a standard deduction from a households gross income. In addition to
this standard deduction, households with labor earnings deduct 20 percent of those earnings from their gross income.
Deductions are also taken for child care and/or care for disabled dependents, medical expenses, and excessive shelter
expenses.
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Kushman, 1987; Mo¢ tt, 1983). Second, transaction costs can diminish the attractiveness of participation.10
A household faces these costs on a repeated basis when it must recertify its eligibility. Third, against these
costs, the benet level may be too small to induce participation; food stamp benets can be as low as $10 a
month for a family.
Reported food stamp participation in survey data may deviate from actual participation. Evidence of this
underreporting has surfaced in two types of studies, both of which compare self-reported information with
o¢ cial records. The rst type has compared aggregate statistics obtained from self-reported survey data with
those obtained from administrative data. These studies suggest the presence of substantial underreporting
of food stamp recipiency. In the CFSM data used in our analysis, Bitler et al. (2003, Table 3) nd that
the number of food stamp recipients in the 1999 CFSM reected only about 85 percent of the true number
according to administrative data. Similar undercounts have been observed in the March Supplement of the
CPS, the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) (Trippe et al., 1992). Other studies have compared individual
reports of food stamp participation status in surveys with matched reports from administrative data. Using
this method, researchers can identify both errors of commission (i.e., reporting benets not actually received)
and errors of omission (i.e., not reporting benets actually received). Using data from the SIPP, Bollinger
and David (1997, Table 2) nd that, consistent with aggregate reports, 0:3 percent of households have errors
of commission while 12:0 percent have errors of omission.
2.3 Data
Our analysis uses data from the December Supplement of the 2003 CPS. The CPS is the o¢ cial data
source for poverty and unemployment rates in the U.S. and has included the CFSM component at least one
month in every year since 1995. In 2003, this component was included in the December Supplement. The
December CPS also contains information on food stamp participation status. For our main analysis, we
dene households as self-reported food stamp participants if they report the receipt of food stamps at some
point over the previous 12 months. Similarly, the standard CFSM questions measure the occurrence of food
insecurity over the previous 12 months.11 We limit our sample to households with children eligible for the
10Examples of such costs include travel time to a food stamp o¢ ce and time spent in the o¢ ce, the burden of
transporting children to the o¢ ce or paying for child care services, and the direct costs of paying for transportation.
11 Ideally, there should be a close correspondence between the time frames that the households report their food
insecurity status and food stamp receipt. We specically choose the 12 month time horizons, however, to be consistent
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Food Stamp Program based on the gross income criterion. Our sample of 2707 observations consists of all
households with children reporting incomes less than 130 percent of the poverty line.12
Table 2 displays joint frequency distributions of reported food insecurity status and food stamp participa-
tion for our sample of eligible households with children. Panel A shows that 52:3% (582=1113) of households
who reported the receipt of food stamps also reported being food insecure. Among households who did not
report the receipt of food stamps, 34:4% (549=1594) reported being food insecure. Based on these responses,
the prevalence of food insecurity is 17:9 percentage points higher among food stamp recipients than among
eligible nonrecipients. Based on analogous information in Panel B, the prevalence of food insecurity with
hunger is 6:5 percentage points higher among food stamp recipients (15:9%) than among eligible nonrecipi-
ents (9:4%). In what follows, we assess what can be inferred about these conditional prevalence rates when
food stamp participation and food insecurity status are subject to classication errors.
3 Identication
To assess the impact of classication error on inferences, we introduce notation that distinguishes between
reported food stamp participation status and true participation status. Let X = 1 indicate that a household
truly receives food stamps, with X = 0 otherwise. Instead of observing X, we observe a self-reported
counterpart X. A latent variable Z indicates whether a report is accurate: Z = 1 if X = X, with
Z = 0 otherwise. Finally, let Y = 1 denote that a household reports being food insecure, with Y = 0
otherwise. Initially, we focus exclusively on food stamp misclassications and assume that food insecurity
status is measured without error. We later allow for the possibility of misclassications in both food stamp
participation and food insecurity status.
Taking self-reports at face value, we can point-identify the food insecurity prevalence rates among food
stamp recipients and nonrecipients as 0:523 and 0:344, respectively (Table 2A) a di¤erence that is statisti-
cally signicant at better than the 1% level. Allowing for the possibility of classication errors, however, we
with previous studies that have investigated relationships between these two variables (e.g., Wilde and Nord, 2005).
In Section 4.3, we consider alternative denitions.
12Our data do not contain su¢ cient information for us to apply the net income test or asset test. However,
virtually all families meeting the gross income test also meet the net income test. The asset test could be important
for a sample that includes a high proportion of households headed by an elderly person (Haider et al., 2003). For
households with children, however, the fraction asset ineligible but gross income eligible is small. Using combined
data from 1989 to 2004 in the March CPS (which does have information on the returns to assets), Gundersen and
O¤utt (2005) nd that only 7:1% of households with children are asset ineligible but gross income eligible.
7
cannot identify P (Y = 1jX) even if reporting errors are thought to occur randomly. To formalize the iden-
tication problem, consider the rate of food insecurity among the true population of food stamp recipients.
This conditional probability is given by
P (Y = 1jX = 1) = P (Y = 1; X
 = 1)
P (X = 1)
. (1)
Since one does not observe X, neither the numerator nor the denominator is identied.13 However,
assumptions on the pattern of reporting errors can place restrictions on relationships between the unobserved
quantities. Let +1  P (Y = 1; X = 1; Z = 0) and  1  P (Y = 1; X = 0; Z = 0) denote the fraction of
false positive and false negative food stamp participation classications, respectively, within the population of
food-insecure households. Similarly, let +0  P (Y = 0; X = 1; Z = 0) and  0  P (Y = 0; X = 0; Z = 0)
denote the fraction of false positive and false negative food stamp participation classications, respectively,
within the population of food-secure households. Then we can decompose the numerator and denominator
in (1) into identied and unidentied quantities:
P (Y = 1jX = 1) = p11 + 
 
1   +1
p+
 
 1 + 
 
0
   +1 + +0  (2)
where p11  P (Y = 1; X = 1) and p  P (X = 1) are identied by the data and the other quantities
are not identied. In the numerator,  1   +1 reects the unobserved excess of false negative vs. false
positive food stamp participation reports for the population of food-insecure households. In the denominator, 
 1 + 
 
0
   +1 + +0  reects the excess of false positive vs. false negative classications within the entire
population of interest. The food insecurity prevalence rate among nonrecipients can be written analogously
as
P (Y = 1jX = 0) = p10 + 
+
1    1
1  p+  +1 + +0     1 +  0  (3)
where p10  P (Y = 1; X = 0).
Worst-case bounds on P (Y = 1jX) are obtained by nding the extrema of equations (2) and (3) subject
to restrictions on the false positives and false negatives +1 , 
+
0 , 
 
1 , and 
 
0 . Without assumptions on the
13For ease of exposition, our notation leaves implicit any other conditioning variables (e.g., variables pertaining to
household composition).
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nature of reporting errors, the following constraints hold:
(i) 0  +1  P (Y = 1; X = 1)  p11
(ii) 0  +0  P (Y = 0; X = 1)  p01
(iii) 0   1  P (Y = 1; X = 0)  p10
(iv) 0   0  P (Y = 0; X = 0)  p00.
For example, the fraction of food insecure households that falsely reports receiving food stamps obviously
cannot exceed the fraction of food insecure households that reports receiving food stamps.
Before considering any structure on the pattern of false positives and false negatives, we begin by assessing
identication given a limit on the potential degree of misclassication. Following Horowitz and Manski (1995)
and the literature on robust statistics (e.g., Huber 1981), we can study how identication of an unknown
parameter varies with the condence in the data. Consider an upper bound, q, on the fraction of inaccurate
food stamp participation classications: P (Z = 0)  q which implies
(v) +1 + 
+
0 + 
 
1 + 
 
0  q.
This assumption incorporates a researchers beliefs about the potential degree of data corruption. If
q equals 0 (as is implicitly assumed in all previous work on food insecurity), then P (Y = 1jX) is point-
identied because all food stamp participation reports are assumed to be accurate. At the opposite extreme,
a researcher unwilling to place any limit on the potential degree of reporting error can set q equal to 1. In
that case, there is no hope of learning anything about P (Y = 1jX) without constraining the pattern of
reporting errors. In any event, the sensitivity of inferences on P (Y = 1jX) can be examined by varying the
value of q between 0 and 1.
In the corrupt sampling case in which nothing is known about the pattern of reporting errors, we
compute sharp bounds on P (Y = 1jX) using a result from Kreider and Pepper (forthcoming, a). After
briey presenting these bounds, we derive narrower sets of bounds by imposing structure on the reporting
error process. We rst consider the identifying power of an assumption that respondents may fail to report
receiving food stamps but not falsely claim to receive food stamps. We then consider the case that food
stamp misreporting arises independently of true participation status. After establishing sets of bounds on
P (Y = 1jX) for the case that food insecurity is accurately reported, we allow for the possibility that food
9
insecurity status may also be misreported. Throughout this analysis, we do not impose the nondi¤erential
errors assumption embedded in the classical errors-in-variables framework.14
3.1 Corrupt sampling bounds
Under arbitrary errors (corrupt sampling), the researcher makes no assumptions about the patterns of
false positive and false negative classications. We can compute closed-form sharp degreebounds in this
environment using the following result:
Corrupt Sampling Degree Bounds (Kreider-Pepper, forthcoming a, Prop. 1): Let P (Z = 0)  q,
and suppose that food insecurity is measured without error. Then the prevalence of food insecurity among
food stamp participants is bounded sharply as follows:
p11   +
p  2+ + q  P (Y = 1jX
 = 1)  p11 + 
 
p+ 2    q
using the values
+ =
(
min fq; p11g if p11   p01   q  0
max f0; q   p00g otherwise
  =
(
min fq; p10g if p11   p01 + q  0
max f0; q   p01g otherwise.
Analogous bounds for the prevalence of food insecurity among nonrecipients, P (Y = 1jX = 0), are obtained
by replacing X = 1 with X = 0 and vice versa in each of the relevant quantities.
Naturally, these bounds can be narrowed if the researcher is willing to make assumptions that restrict the
pattern of reporting errors. Suppose, for example, that the researcher believes that food stamp participation
is potentially underreported but households do not falsely claim to receive food stamps. This assumption is
consistent with the evidence discussed above regarding errors of omission and errors of commission (Bollinger
and David, 2001). In this case, we can simply impose +1 = 
+
0 = 0 in Equations (2) and (3). The sharp lower
bound on P (Y = 1jX = 1) is attained when  1 = 0 and  0 = min fq; p00g while the sharp upper bound
is attained when  0 = 0 and 
 
1 = min fq; p10g. Similarly, the sharp lower bound on P (Y = 1jX = 0) is
attained when  0 = 0 and 
 
1 = min fq; p10g while the sharp upper bound is attained when  1 = 0 and
14 In our context, this assumption would require that, conditional on true participation status, participation classi-
cation errors arise independently of food insecurity status. Bollinger (1996) studies identication of a mean regression
when a potentially mismeasured binary conditioning variable satises the nondi¤erential errors assumption.
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 0 = min fq; p00g. As a straightforward extension of the corrupt sampling bounds, we obtain the closed-form
no false positivesbounds:
Proposition 1: Let P (Z = 0)  q and suppose that households do not falsely report the receipt of food
stamps. Suppose further that food insecurity is measured without error. Then the conditional food insecurity
prevalence rates are bounded sharply as follows:
p11
p+min fq; p00g  P (Y = 1jX
 = 1)  p11 +min fq; p10g
p+min fq; p10g
p10  min fq; p10g
1  p min fq; p10g  P (Y = 1jX
 = 0)  p10
1  p min fq; p00g .
The assumption of no false positive reports does not always improve all of the bounds. For example, suppose
that the allowed degree of classication error is small enough that q  min fp00; p11   p01g. In this case, the
lower bound on P (Y = 1jX = 1) under the assumption of no false positive reports is identical to the lower
bound under corrupt sampling.
3.2 Orthogonal participation errors
Many studies have assumed that classication errors arise independently of the variables true value (see
Molinari (2005) for a discussion). Bollinger (1996), for example, discusses the possibility that a workers
true union status has no inuence on whether union status is misreported in the data. Kreider and Pepper
(forthcoming, b) consider the identifying assumption that, among certain types of respondents, misreported
disability status does not depend on true disability status.15 In the present context, this independence
assumption implies that misreporting of food stamp participation is orthogonal to true participation status:
P (X = 1jZ = 1) = P (X = 1jZ = 0). (4)
In this case, the false positive and false negative classication errors must satisfy the constraint:
(vi)

1  p  ( 1 +  0 )
  
+1 + 
+
0

+ ( 1 + 
 
0 )

=
 
+1 + 
+
0
 
1   +1 + +0   ( 1 +  0 ) .
15 In contrast to our analysis, their objective is to place bounds on an unknown marginal distribution. They do not
consider misclassication of a conditioning variable.
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Based on earlier discussion, there is reason to believe that food stamp reporting errors are not random.
Nevertheless, the orthogonality assumption is weaker than the usual assumption of no classication errors,
and it serves as a useful benchmark case for comparison.
Sharp bounds on the conditional food insecurity rates, P (Y = 1jX), can be found by searching over all
feasible combinations of

+1 ; 
+
0 ; 
 
1 ; 
 
0
	
in (2) subject to satisfying constraint (vi). Computational costs
associated with a simultaneous search over three of these four parameters (after imposing the constraint),
however, can quickly become burdensome at high values of q especially while bootstrapping to obtain con-
dence intervals or when combining the independence assumption with other restrictions.16 As we elaborate
below, our Proposition 2 provides simple-to-compute bounds that require only single-dimension searches.
We focus discussion on deriving a lower bound on P (Y = 1jX = 1). Di¤erentiating (2), it can be shown
that P (Y = 1jX = 1) is increasing in  1 and +0 and decreasing in  0 and +1 . Given independence, however,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the lower bound involves positive values of  1 or 
+
0 . Increasing these
values above zero allows for the possibility of increasing  0 or 
+
1 while remaining on the independence
contour.
To obtain a computationally expedient lower bound on P (Y = 1jX = 1) given orthogonal errors, we
analyze a series of exhaustive cases. The smallest calculated lower bound across these cases establishes the
lower bound of interest. We proceed using the following outline: In Case 1, we derive the lower bound under
the possibility that  1 = 
+
0 = 0. In Case 2, we derive the lower bound under the possibility that 
 
1 = 0
and +0 > 0. In this case, the lower bound cannot involve 
+
0 > 0 unless 
+
1 = p11 which eliminates 
+
1 as an
unknown parameter. Cases 3 and 4 are similar. The lower bound on P (Y = 1jX = 1) is then obtained as
the smallest lower bound derived under four possible cases. In each case, there exists only one free parameter
to search across after imposing the independence constraint.
Case 1:  1 = 
+
0 = 0:
When  1 = 
+
0 = 0, there are two free parameters in Equation (2): 
+
1 and 
 
0 . For any candi-
date value of +1 , the independence constraint (vi) constrains 
 
0 to be one of two values: 
 
0;j(
+
1 ) 
(1 p)+( 1)j
p
(1 p)2 4+1 (p +1 )
2 for j = 1; 2. By constraint (i), the fraction of respondents who reported being
16For example, one might impose a monotone instrumental variables (MIV) assumption (Manski and Pepper, 2000)
that true food insecurity varies monotonically with particular variables. In this case, the cells would need to be further
partitioned for each allowed value of the instrumental variable.
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food insecure and misreported being a food stamp participant cannot exceed the fraction who participated
and reported being food insecure: +1 2
h
0; +1
i
. By constraint (iv), the fraction of respondents that did
not participate and misreported being food secure cannot exceed the fraction that did not participate in the
Food Stamp Program and reported being food secure:  0 2
h
0;  0
i
. By constraint (v), the total fraction of
misreporters +1 + 
 
0 cannot exceed q. Therefore, the lower bound when 
 
1 = 
+
0 = 0 is given by
LB1 = inf
+1 21j ;j=1;2
p11   +1
p+  0;j(
+
1 )  +1
where 1j 
h
0; +1
i
\
n
+1 : 
 
0;j(
+
1 ) 2
h
0;  0
io
\ +1 : +1 +  0;j(+1 )  q	
and  0;j(
+
1 )  (1 p)+( 1)
j
p
(1 p)2 4+1 (p +1 )
2 for j = 1; 2.
From a practical standpoint, this lower bound is obtained by simply searching for the smallest value of
p11 +1
p+ 0;j(
+
1 ) +1
across feasible values of +1 2
h
0; +1
i
. Feasible values of +1 include those associated with a
value of  0;j that lies in the allowed range
h
0;  0
i
, subject to the requirement that the sum +1 + 
 
0;j is not
too large.
Case 2:  1 = 0, 
+
0 > 0:
First notice that +1 and 
+
0 are perfectly substitutable in constraints (v) and (vi). Moreover, di¤eren-
tiating (2) when  1 = 0 reveals that increasing 
+
1 lowers the ratio in (2) by more than raising the value of
+0 (for any values of 
+
1 , 
+
0 , and 
 
0 ). Therefore, the optimal value of 
+
0 cannot exceed zero unless 
+
1 has
attained its maximum feasible value +1 . The lower bound when 
 
1 = 0 and 
+
0 > 0 is given by
LB2 = inf
 0 22j ;j=1;2
p11   +1
p+  0   +1   +0;j( 0 )
where 2j 
h
0;  0
i
\
n
 0 : 
+
0;j(
 
0 ) 2

0; +0
io
\
n
 0 : 
+
1 + 
+
0;j(
 
0 ) + 
 
0  q
o
and +0;j(
 
0 ) 
p 2+1 +( 1)j
q
p2 4 0 (1 p  0 )
2 for j = 1; 2.
Case 3: +0 = 0, 
 
1 > 0:
Similar to Case 2,  1 and 
 
0 are perfectly substitutable in constraints (v) and (vi). Di¤erentiating
(2) when +0 = 0 reveals that increasing 
 
0 lowers the ratio by more than raising the value of 
 
1 (for any
values of +1 , 
 
1 , and 
 
0 ). Therefore, the optimal value of 
 
1 cannot exceed zero unless 
 
0 has attained its
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maximum feasible value  0 . The lower bound when 
+
0 = 0 and 
 
1 > 0 is given by
LB3 = inf
 1 23j ;j=1;2
p11 + 
 
1   +1j( 1 )
p+  1 + 
 
0   +1j( 1 )
where 3j 

0;  1
i
\
n
 1 : 
+
1j(
 
1 ) 2
h
0; +1
io
\
n
 1 : 
 
0 + 
+
1j(
 
1 ) + 
 
1  q
o
and +1j(
 
1 ) 
p+( 1)j
r
p2 4

 0 +
 
1

1 p  1   0

2 for j = 1; 2.
Case 4:  1 > 0, 
+
0 > 0:
Given +1 = 
+
1 and 
 
0 = 
 
0 when 
 
1 and 
+
0 are positive, the lower bound when 
 
1 > 0 and 
+
0 > 0 is
given by
LB4 = inf
+0 24j ;j=1;2
p11 + 
 
1j(
+
0 )  +1
p+  1j(
+
0 ) + 
 
0   +1   +0
where 4j 

0; +0
i
\
n
+0 : 
 
1j(
+
0 ) 2

0;  1
io
\
n
+0 : 
+
1 + 
 
0 + 
 
1j(
+
0 ) + 
+
0  q
o
and  1j(
+
0 ) 
1 p 2 0 +( 1)j
r
(1 p)2 4

+1 +
+
0

p +1  +0

2 for j = 1; 2.
Combining these results with analogous results for upper bounds, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let P (Z = 0)  q, and suppose that food insecurity is measured without error. Then sharp
bounds on P (Y = 1jX = 1) under the orthogonal errors assumption in (4) are identied as

L  P (Y = 1jX = 1)  
H (5)
where 
L  inf fLB1; LB2; LB3; LB4g and 
H  sup fUB1; UB2; UB3; UB4g. Analogous bounds on P (Y =
1jX = 0) are obtained by replacing X = 1 with X = 0, and vice versa, in the relevant quantities.
The expressions for the upper bounds are provided in Appendix A.17 The bounds converge to the self-
reported conditional food insecurity rate P (Y = 1jX = 1) as q goes to 0. Increasing q may widen the
bounds over some ranges of q but not others, and the rate of identication decay can be highly nonlinear as
q increases.
17For su¢ ciently high values of q, some values lying between the worst-case lower and upper bounds may not be
feasible under the independence constraint of Equation (4); sharp identication regions can be constructed, if desired,
by simply excluding such values.
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These bounds are easy to program, and computing time is trivial given that searches are conducted in
a single dimension. To compute LB1, for example, we need only to search over feasible values of 
+
1 . In our
application, computational speed for the Proposition 2 bounds at q = 0:5 is more than 3300 times faster
than the speed associated with a simultaneous search across three of the four parameters +1 , 
+
0 , 
 
1 , and
 0 (reduced to three dimensions after incorporating the independence constraint).
18 Moreover, the single-
dimensional search allows us to avoid specifying an arbitrary tolerance threshold for when independence is
satised. If the specied tolerance is too small, the calculated bounds become articially narrow as feasible
bounds are excluded from consideration. In contrast, a large tolerance leads to unnecessarily conservative
estimated bounds. In practice, we found it quite time-consuming to nd a reasonable balance between speed
and accuracy  a trade-o¤ that varies across di¤erent values of q. The proposed single-dimension search
procedure e¤ectively avoids this problem.
3.3 Food insecurity classication errors
To this point, we have conned our attention to classication errors in food stamp participation. For reasons
noted above, however, we might also suspect the presence of errors in food insecurity reports. Suppose
that true food insecurity status is measured by the latent indicator Y . The observed indicator Y matches
the true value Y  if Z0 = 1 and is misclassied if Z0 = 0. Analogous to the case of misreported food
stamp participation, let q0 represent an upper bound on the allowed degree of corruption in Y : P (Z0 =
0)  q0. Modifying Equation (1), the true food insecurity prevalence rate among food stamp recipients and
nonrecipients is given by
p1k =
P (Y  = 1; X = k)
P (X = k)
. (6)
where p1k  P (Y  = 1jX = k) for k = 1; 0.
Given the possibility of classication errors in both X and Y , there are now many more types of error
combinations. We represent these combinations by uvjk . The subscripts j and k indicate true food insecurity
status and true food stamp participation status, respectively. Specically, j = 1 indicates that the household
is truly food secure (j = 0 otherwise), and k = 1 indicates that the household truly receives food stamps
(k = 0 otherwise). The superscripts indicate whether these outcomes are falsely classied, and if so, in
18For di¤erent empirical applications, these values will vary depending on the quantities p11; p01; p10; p00 dened
above.
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which direction. Specically, u =+indicates that the household is misclassied as food insecure, u = 
indicates that the household is misclassied as food secure, and u =oindicates that food insecurity status
is not misclassied. Similarly, v =+ indicates that the household is misclassied as receiving benets,
v =  indicates that the household is misclassied as not receiving benets, and v =o indicates that
participation status is not misclassied.
As before, we can decompose the numerator and denominator into observed and unobserved components:
p11 =
P (Y = 1; X = 1) +
 
 o11 + 
o 
11 + 
  
11
   o+10 + +o01 + ++00 
P (X = 1) +
 
o 11 + 
  
11 + 
+ 
01 + 
o 
01
   o+10 + ++00 +  +10 + o+00  .
Similarly, we can write
p10 =
P (Y = 1; X = 0) +
 
 o10 + 
o+
10 + 
 +
10
   o 11 + +o00 + + 01 
P (X = 0) +
 
o+10 + 
 +
10 + 
++
00 + 
o+
00
   o 11 + + 01 +   11 + o 01  .
We can compute sharp bounds on p11 and p

10 by searching across all feasible combinations of false
positive and false negative classications in X and Y . The following constraints must hold, analogous to
constraints (i -iv) earlier:
(i) 0  +o01 ; o+10 ; ++00  P (Y = 1; X = 1)  p11
(ii) 0  o+00 ;  o11 ;  +10  P (Y = 0; X = 1)  p01
(iii) 0  +o00 ; o 11 ; + 01  P (Y = 1; X = 0)  p10
(iv) 0   o10 ;   11 ; o 01  P (Y = 0; X = 0)  p00.
For example, the fraction of households simultaneously misclassied as food insecure and misclassied as
receiving food stamps, ++00 , cannot exceed the fraction of households who report being food insecure with
food stamps, p11. The errors must also satisfy the constraints
(v) o+00 + 
 +
10 + 
o+
10 + 
++
00 + 
o 
11 + 
  
11 + 
+ 
01 + 
o 
01  q.
and
(v)  o11 + 
 +
10 + 
+o
01 + 
+o
00 + 
++
00 + 
+ 
01 + 
 o
10 + 
  
11  q0:
A search over all combinations of errors becomes rapidly burdensome as the values of q and q0 are allowed
to rise. Nevertheless, the problem is feasible for su¢ ciently low degrees of potential data corruption. For
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the case of corrupt sampling, the search problem is greatly simplied because no structure is placed on
the pattern of errors. In that case, many of the unknown parameters for each bound can be set to 0. For
example, suppose we wish to compute a sharp lower bound on p11. It is easy to see that the lower bound
requires o+00 = 
 +
10 = 
 o
11 = 0. Di¤erentiation further reveals that 
  
11 = 
o 
11 = 0 as well. Analogous
restrictions arise for the other bounds. For the case that we assume orthogonal errors in X and/or Y , we
cannot set any of the parameters to 0. Instead, we search over all feasible combinations of errors subject to
the requirement that candidates for the bounds are discarded unless the appropriate orthogonality analogues
to constraint (vi) are satised.19
We next turn to empirical results. We rst illustrate what can be identied about conditional food
insecurity prevalence rates under the assumption that the receipt of benets may be misclassied but food
insecurity is accurately measured. We then allow for the possibility that food insecurity is misreported as
well. We pinpoint critical values of allowed degrees of data corruption for when we can no longer identify
that food stamp recipients are more likely to be food insecure than eligible nonrecipients.
4 Results
4.1 Food Stamp Classication Errors
Figures 2 and 3 trace out patterns of identication decay for inferences on the prevalence of food insecurity
among food stamp recipients and nonrecipients, respectively, as a function of the allowed degree of data
corruption, q. As discussed above, we focus our attention on eligible households with children. For these
gures, we assume that only food stamp participation is subject to classication error; food insecurity
classications are presumed to be accurate.
In Figure 2 we examine what can be known about p11, the prevalence of food insecurity among food
stamp recipients. When q = 0, all food stamp classications are taken at face value; uncertainty about the
magnitude of  arises from sampling variability alone. As seen in the gure and the table beneath it, the
prevalence rate at q = 0 is point-identied as p11 = 0:523 with 90% condence interval [0:496; 0:545].
What can be known about p11 when q > 0 depends on what the researcher is willing to assume about the
nature and degree of reporting errors. If q = 0:05, then up to 5% of the food stamp classications may be
inaccurate. In this case under arbitrary errors, p11 is partially identied to lie within the range [0:457; 0:595],
19Our Gauss computer code for computing these bounds is available upon request.
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a 14 point range. After accounting for sampling variability, this range expands to [0:427; 0:621], a 19 point
range. The gure traces out the 5th percentile lower bound and 95th percentile upper bound across values
of q.20 The bounds naturally widen as our condence in the reliability of the data declines. Once q exceeds
about 0:21, we cannot say anything about the food insecurity rate of food stamp recipients; the prevalence
rate could lie anywhere within [0; 1]. The bounds narrow if we are willing to make assumptions about the
pattern of errors. At q = 0:05, for example, the bounds on p11 narrow to [0:461; 0:586] under orthogonal errors
(before accounting for sampling variability) and to [0:466; 0:575] under the no false positives assumption.
Figure 3 presents analogous bounds for p10, the prevalence of food insecurity among nonrecipients. At
q = 0, this prevalence rate is point-identied as p10 = 0:344, about 18 points lower than the food insecurity
rate among recipients. For q > 0, the orthogonality restriction substantially improves the lower bound
relative to corrupt sampling. The upper bound, however, is not substantially improved except for high
values of q. The assumption of no false positive classications marginally improves the upper bound and has
no e¤ect on the lower bound.
Figure 4 provides sharp bounds on   p11 p10, the di¤erence in food insecurity rates (Figure 4A) and
food insecurity with hunger rates (Figure 4B) between food stamp recipients and nonrecipients. A simple
lower (upper) bound on  could be computed as the di¤erence between the lower (upper) bound on p11
and the upper (lower) bound on p10. Such bounds would not be as tight as possible, however, because a
di¤erent set of values of

+1 ; 
+
0 ; 
 
1 ; 
 
0
	
might maximize (minimize) the expression in Equation (2) than
would minimize (maximize) the expression in Equation (3). Instead, we obtain sharp bounds on  as follows:
LB = min
+1 ;
+
0 ;
 
1 ;
 
0
(
p11 + 
 
1   +1
p+
 
 1 + 
 
0
   +1 + +0    p10 + 
+
1    1
1  p+  +1 + +0     1 +  0 
)
UB = max
+1 ;
+
0 ;
 
1 ;
 
0
(
p11 + 
 
1   +1
p+
 
 1 + 
 
0
   +1 + +0    p10 + 
+
1    1
1  p+  +1 + +0     1 +  0 
)
subject to all constraints imposed on the pattern of classication errors.
Figure 4A shows that small degrees of classication error are su¢ cient to overturn the conclusion from
the data that  > 0, even without accounting for uncertainty arising from sampling variability. Under
20We bootstrap to obtain these values using the bias-corrected percentile method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993)
using 1,000 pseudosamples. The kinks at various values of q reect the impacts of constraints (i)-(vi) on allowed
combinations of false positives and false negatives (Section 3). For su¢ ciently small values of q, constraints (i)-(iv )
are not binding because constraint (vi) prevents +1 ; 
+
0 ; 
 
1 ; or 
 
0 from attaining their maximum feasible values. As
q rises, however, each of the other constraints eventually becomes binding, resulting in a kink in the gure. This kink
is somewhat smoothed by bootstrapping across the pseudosamples.
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arbitrary errors, we cannot identify that  is positive if more than 7:1% of households might misreport their
food stamp participation status. These critical values rise to 8:2% and 9:1% under orthogonal errors and
no false positives, respectively. Panel B in the gure reproduces Panel A except that Y  = 1 is redened
as food insecurity with hunger. Here, we nd that identication of the sign of  breaks down when q is
only 0:018 under arbitrary errors and when q is only 0:029 under orthogonal errors. Both are far lower than
for the case of food insecurity. Under the assumption of no false positives, the critical value rises to 0:124.
Again, these critical values are conservatively high in that they do not account for the additional uncertainty
created by sampling variability.
As discussed in Section 2.2, Bollinger and David (1997) nd that 12% of households fail to report their
receipt of food stamps; evidence from Bitler et al. (2003) suggests the possibility of even greater degrees
of undercounting. Thus, even before accounting for the possible mismeasurement of food insecurity status,
we nd it di¢ cult to conclude that food insecurity is more prevalent among food stamp recipients than
among eligible nonrecipients. Such a conclusion requires a large degree of condence in self-reported food
participation status. In the next section, we extend the analysis to the case that both food stamp recipiency
and food insecurity may be misclassied. We then consider the sensitivity of our ndings to alternative
denitions and samples.
4.2 Food stamp and food insecurity classication errors
As discussed above, the possibility of food insecurity classication errors further confounds identication.
Table 3 provides critical values for identication breakdown that vary across the di¤erent assumptions on
the nature of classication errors. Row A reproduces information highlighted in Figure 4A for the case of
fully accurate food insecurity classications. Now suppose that food insecurity status might be misclassied
for up to 5% of households: q0 = 0:05. If these errors arise independently of true food insecurity status (Row
B), then the sign of  cannot be identied under arbitrary program participation errors unless it is assumed
that fewer than 2:8% of households might misreport their food stamp recipiency.
These critical values rise only slightly under the stronger assumptions of orthogonal food stamp errors
(3:3%) and no false positive food stamp reports (4:1%). In Row C for the case of arbitrarily misreported
food insecurity status, the critical values fall further to 2:1%, 2:4%, and 3:5%, respectively. Once q0 exceeds
0:084 under orthogonal errors or 0:0073 under arbitrary errors, the sign of  is not identied even if all food
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stamp responses are known to be accurate. For the case of food insecurity with hunger, yet smaller degrees
of uncertainty about the data are su¢ cient to lose identication of the sign of .
4.3 Alternative time frames and samples
We now examine the sensitivity of our main ndings to alternative time frames and samples. We rst
consider the timing of food insecurity and food stamp receipt. Using the standard federal government
classications, our main analysis measures the occurrence of food insecurity and food stamp participation
over the previous 12 months. Because these outcomes may change over the course of the year, however, this
aggregation represents a potential source of measurement error distinct from misreporting. For example,
some respondents might have been food insecure early in the year and then subsequently decided to receive
food stamps. Even if food stamps alleviated the households food insecurity, the household would be coded
as a food insecure beneciary. Thus, part of the observed positive relationship between food insecurity and
program participation may be an artifact of mismatched time horizons.
To investigate this timing issue, we consider two alternative specications. For the rst alternative, we
assess how our results are a¤ected when we limit the sample to households who report no changes in their
food stamp participation status over the past 12 months. Of the original 2702 households, we eliminate 413
households who reported the receipt of food stamps for some months but not others (resulting in a sample
size of 2294). For the second alternative, we retain the full sample but shorten the food insecurity and food
stamp participation time horizons to the past 30 days.21 Frames B and C in Appendix Table 1 display joint
frequency distributions analogous to those provided in Table 2.
Table 4 compares critical values obtained from these alternative analyses to those from the primary
analysis. Table 4, Row A reproduces critical values from Table 3, Row A (and Figure 4). For example, the
sign of  cannot be identied under orthogonal participation errors unless it is known that fewer than 8:2%
of respondents misreport participation (2:9% for the case of food insecurity with hunger). We conservatively
focus on the case that food insecurity is assumed to be measured without error. As seen in Table 4 Row B,
our main results are fairly insensitive to the exclusion of households reporting part-year food stamp benets.
The self-reported value of  falls from 0:178 to 0:154, and the critical values of q for identifying the sign
of  fall somewhat compared with Row A. In Row C when the time horizons are shortened to 30 days,
21 In this case, households respond to a shorter list of food insecurity questions. With this shorter list, we can
measure food insecurity but not food insecurity with hunger.
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the self-reported value  falls to 0:046. Critical values fall correspondingly under the arbitrary errors and
orthogonal errors assumptions. In those cases, the sign of  cannot be identied for participation error rates
as low as 2%.
We also assess the sensitivity of the results to other changes in the sample composition. Row D pro-
vides critical values for the subsample of single parent households. Row E provides corresponding values
for households with incomes below 50% of the poverty line. Reported food stamp participation rates are
higher among these groups (53% and 63%, respectively) than for our primary sample (41%). In most cases,
conditioning on these characteristics has little e¤ect on self-reported values of  or on the critical values. In
any case, we cannot identify the sign of  if food stamp error rates may exceed 10%, even abstracting away
from mismeasured food insecurity and uncertainty associated with sampling variability. Collectively, these
ndings suggest that we should not be condent that food stamp recipient households are less likely to be
food secure than nonrecipient households unless we are willing to place a large degree of condence in the
data.
5 Conclusion
As the cornerstone of the federal food assistance system, the Food Stamp Program is charged with being the
rst line of defense against hunger. In this light, researchers and policymakers have been puzzled to observe
negative relationships between food security and the receipt of food stamps among observationally similar
eligible households. Using a multivariate logit regression framework, for example, Wilde and Nord (2005)
estimate a negative impact of food stamp participation on food security even after controlling for unobserved
xed e¤ects. Given no plausible mechanism through which food stamps would diminish food security, they
conclude that their estimated coe¢ cient is biased due to unobserved time-varying household characteristics.
While we agree that the paradox might be explained by unobserved characteristics, we also nd that
the paradox hinges on strong assumptions about the reliability of the data. Food insecurity responses are
partially subjective, and evidence from Bollinger and David (1997) and Bitler et al. (2003) suggests that
error rates in self-reported food stamp recipiency exceed 12%. We introduced a nonparametric empirical
framework for assessing what can be inferred about conditional probabilities when a binary outcome and
conditioning variable are both subject to nonclassical measurement error. Even when we impose strong
21
assumptions restricting the patterns of classication errors, we nd that food stamp participation error
rates much smaller than 12% are su¢ cient to prevent us from being able to draw rm conclusions about
relationships between food stamp participation and food insecurity. The possibility of misreported food
insecurity exacerbates the uncertainty.
More generally, our analysis derives easy-to-compute sharp bounds on partially identied conditional
probabilities when a binary outcome and a binary conditioning variable are both subject to arbitrary en-
dogenous classication error. The framework can be applied to a wide range of topics in the social sciences
involving nonrandom classication errors. We have not, however, attempted to provide a structural model
of food stamp eligibility and participation. Our approach, for example, cannot identify the policy impacts
of proposed changes in food assistance programs. Instead, our approach is intended to provide a useful
starting point for understanding what can be known about relationships between food insecurity and food
stamp participation under current policies. We hope that future research aimed at identifying food assistance
policy e¤ects will explicitly account for the uncertainty associated with potential reporting errors in the key
variables of interest.
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Table 1 
 
Food Insecurity Questions in the Core Food Security Module 
 
 
 
 
   
Food Insecurity Question 
 
 
Fraction of Households 
Responding Affirmatively 
 
 
  1.   Worried food would run out 
 
0.535 
  2.    Food bought did not last 0.426 
  3.    Respondent did not eat balanced meal 0.322 
  4.    Child fed few, low-cost foods 0.399 
  5.    Adult(s) cut/skip meals 0.202 
  6.    Child not fed balanced meals 0.235 
  7.    Respondent ate less than should 0.143 
  8.    Adult(s) skipped meals for 3 or more months 0.203 
  9.    Child not eating enough 0.133 
  10.  Respondent hungry but did not eat 0.099 
  11.  Respondent lost weight 0.055 
  12.  Child’s meal size cut 0.033 
  13.  Adult(s) did not eat for whole day 0.038 
  14.  Child was hungry 0.023 
  15.  Adult(s) did not eat for whole day for 3 or more months 0.028 
  16.  Child skipped meal 0.011 
  17.  Child skipped meal(s) for 3 or more months 0.008 
  18.  Child did not eat for whole day 0.002 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Responses to Food Insecurity Questions, by Food Insecurity Status 
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Table 2 
 
Reported Food Insecurity Status and Food Stamp Participation Among Eligible Households 
 
 
A. Food Insecurity 
 
 
 Food Stamp Participant  
“Food 
Insecure” 
 
   Totals 
 yes no  
    
yes 582 
(21.5%) 
549 
(20.3%) 
1131 
(41.8%) 
 
no 531 
(20.3%) 
1045 
(38.6%) 
1576 
(58.2%) 
    
Totals 1113 1594 N=2707 
 (41.1%) (58.9%)  
  
 
 
B. Food Insecurity With Hunger 
 
 
 Food Stamp Participant  
 
“Food Insecure  
  With Hunger” 
   
 
   Totals 
 yes no  
    
yes 177 
(6.5%) 
150 
(5.5%) 
327 
(12.1%) 
 
no 936 
(34.6%) 
1444 
(53.3%) 
2380 
(87.9%) 
    
Totals 1113 1594 N=2707 
 (41.1%) (58.9%)  
    
 
Figure 2 
 
  Sharp Bounds on the Prevalence of Food Insecurity Among Households 
With Children that Receive Food Stamps 
 
 
Fully Accurate Reporting of Food Insecurity Status,  
   Potentially Misclassified Food Stamp Recipiency  
 
 
 
 
Food Insecurity Rate Among  
Food Stamp Recipients 
 
95% UB under corrupt sampling
95% UB given orthogonal errors 
   
 
 
 
 
5% LB under
corrupt 
sampling 
 
 95% UB if no false positives 
 
 
0.545 
0.496 5% LB if no false positives 
 
 
 
 
5% LB given 
orthogonal errors 
 
 
 
                     q 
(allowed degree of food stamp 
 participation misclassification) 
0.05                0.10
 
 
           
                                   Corrupt Sampling        Orthogonal Errors    No False Positive Reports 
  q=0          [ 0.523, 0.523]†        [ 0.523, 0.523]         [ 0.523, 0.523]         
               [ 0.496  0.545] ‡          [ 0.496  0.545]           [ 0.496  0.545]            
        
q=0.05   [ 0.457, 0.595]         [ 0.461, 0.586]         [ 0.466, 0.575]         
            [ 0.427  0.621]         [ 0.434  0.609]         [ 0.443  0.595]         
 
q=0.10        [ 0.370, 0.691]         [ 0.396, 0.652]         [ 0.421, 0.616]         
[ 0.330  0.721]         [ 0.364  0.677]         [ 0.399  0.635]         
 
q=0.25   [ 0.000, 1.000]         [ 0.141, 0.916]         [ 0.325, 0.681]         
[ 0.000  1.000]         [ 0.095  0.960]     [ 0.306  0.697]         
            
  “5% LB” = 5th percentile lower bound; “95% UB” = 95th percentile upper bound 
 
 
 
† Point estimates of the population bounds 
‡ Bootstrapped 5th and 95th percentile bounds (1,000 pseudosamples) 
Figure 3 
 
Sharp Bounds on the Prevalence of Food Insecurity Among Eligible Households 
that Do Not Receive Food Stamps 
 
Fully Accurate Reporting of Food Insecurity Status,  
   Potentially Misclassified Food Stamp Recipiency  
 
 
 
 
Food Insecurity Rate Among  
Food Stamp Nonrecipients 
 
 
 
 95% UB given 
orthogonal errors  
 95% UB under 
corrupt sampling  
 
 
95% UB if no false positives  
 
 
0.365 
0.321 5% LB given orthogonal errors 
   
 
5% LB under corrupt sampling
or if no false positives 
 
 
 
                     q 
(allowed degree of food stamp 
 participation misclassification) 
0.05                0.10
 
 
 
                           Corrupt Sampling       Orthogonal Errors    No False Positive Reports 
 
  q=0          [ 0.344, 0.344]†        [ 0.344, 0.344]         [ 0.344, 0.344]         
               [ 0.321  0.365] ‡          [ 0.321  0.365]           [ 0.321  0.365]            
        
q=0.05   [ 0.284, 0.396]         [ 0.305, 0.389]         [ 0.284, 0.376]         
           [ 0.258  0.415]         [ 0.282  0.409]         [ 0.258  0.399]         
 
q=0.10        [ 0.210, 0.440]         [ 0.268, 0.432]         [ 0.210, 0.415]         
[ 0.181  0.458]         [ 0.245  0.452]         [ 0.181  0.440]         
 
q=0.25   [ 0.000, 0.599]         [ 0.181, 0.549]         [ 0.000, 0.599]         
[ 0.000  0.637]         [ 0.155  0.568]     [ 0.000  0.637]        
            
“5% LB” = 5th percentile lower bound; “95% UB” = 95th percentile upper bound 
† Point estimates of the population bounds 
‡ Bootstrapped 5th and 95th percentile bounds (1,000 pseudosamples) 
Figure 4 
 
Sharp Bounds on the Difference in Food Insecurity Prevalence Rates Between Food Stamp 
Recipients and Nonrecipients (Among Eligible Households with Children) 
 
Fully Accurate Reporting of Food Insecurity Status,  
Potentially Misclassified Food Stamp Recipiency  
 
 
                                                      A. Food Insecurity  
 
 
 
 
 
 0.178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Food Insecurity with Hunger           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 † Point estimates of the population bounds     
Difference in Food Insecurity With 
Hunger Prevalence Rates (Δ)  
Difference in Food Insecurity 
Prevalence Rates (Δ)  
0.064 
 0.018  0.029                                                    0.124
UB under
corrupt sampling 
UB given 
orthogonal errors UB if no 
false positives 
LB given 
orthogonal errors LB if no false 
positives 
LB under 
corrupt sampling 
LB under 
corrupt sampling LB given 
orthogonal errors 
   
UB under 
corrupt sampling 
0.071  0.082    0.101
UB if no 
false positives 
UB given 
orthogonal errors 
LB if no false 
positives 
   q 
   q 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Critical Values for the Maximum Allowed Degree of Food Stamp Recipiency Misclassification 
Before the Sign of the Food Insecurity Gap, Δ, is No Longer Identified 
 
 
 
Type of Classification Error in Food Stamp Participation Status, X*
Type of Classification Error 
   in Food Insecurity Status, Y*  
(i) Arbitrary errors 
     (corrupt sampling)  
(ii) Orthogonal errors:     
      P(X*=1|Z’) = P(X*=1)  
(iii) No False Positive  
       Classifications 
       
   
       
  Critical value of q:a  Critical value of q:  Critical value of q:
       
     A. No food insecurity errors     0.071  0.082   0.101 
       
     B. Orthogonal errors:  
           P(Y*=1|Z’) = P(Y*=1) with q’ = 0.05b
 0.028  0.033  0.041 
       
     C. Arbitrary errors (corrupt sampling) 
           with q’ = 0.05c
 0.021  0.024  0.035 
       
aMaximum allowed degree of reporting error in food stamp participation, qc, such that the sign of Δ is no longer identified for  
   higher allowed error rates.  Critical values are conservatively large in that they do not account for sampling variability. 
bIf q’ exceeds 0.084, the sign of Δ is not identified even if all food stamp participation responses are known to be accurate (i.e., q = 0). 
cIf q’ exceeds 0.073, the sign of Δ is not identified even if all food stamp participation responses are known to be accurate (i.e., q = 0). 
 
Table 4 
 
Critical Values for the Maximum Allowed Degree of Food Stamp Recipiency Misclassification Before the Sign 
of the Food Insecurity Gap, Δ, is No Longer Identified:  Alternative Time Frames and Samples 
   
  Type of Classification Error in Food Stamp Participation Status, X*
   (i)  Food Insecurity 
   (ii) Food Insecurity With Hunger  
(i) Arbitrary errors 
     (corrupt sampling)  
(ii) Orthogonal errors:     
      P(X*=1|Z’) = P(X*=1)  
(iii) No False Positive 
       Classifications 
       
       
 Self-reported Δ   Critical value of q:†  Critical value of q:  Critical value of q:
       
A. Base Results  
    (Table 2, Row A: N = 2707)   
     (i)   0.178 
     (ii)  0.065 
0.071 
0.018 
 0.082  
0.029 
 0.101 
0.124 
       
B. Households Reporting Food Stamp 
     Receipt for all 12 Months or 
     Zero Months (N = 2294)  
     (i)   0.154 
     (ii)  0.049 
0.053 
0.011 
 
 0.060  
0.015 
 
 0.083 
0.093 
       
C. Food Stamp Participation and  
     Food Insecurity Defined over  
     Previous 30 Days (N = 2707)   
     (i)   0.046 
     (ii)   NA‡  
0.012 
NA 
 0.017  
NA  
 0.066 
NA 
 
       
D. Single Parent Households  
     (N = 1514) 
     (i)   0.138 
     (ii)  0.051 
0.064 
0.014 
 0.070 
0.027 
 0.076 
0.088 
       
E. Households with Incomes Below 
     50% of Poverty Line (N = 696) 
     (i)   0.187 
     (ii)  0.064 
0.075 
0.066 
 0.090 
0.073 
 0.098 
0.080 
       
†Maximum allowed degree of reporting error in food stamp participation, qc, such that the sign of Δ is no longer identified for higher allowed  
   error rates.  Critical values are conservatively large in that (1) they do not account for sampling variability and (2) food insecurity is  
   assumed to be measured without error.   ‡In this case, the data are insufficient to measure food insecurity with hunger. 
 
Appendix Table 1 
 
Reported Food Insecurity Status and Food Stamp Participation Among Eligible Households: 
 
Alternative Time Frames and Samples 
 
 
 
 
        A. Base values (see Table 1, N=2294) 
 
 
 
        B. Households Reporting Food Stamp Receipt for all 12 Months or Zero Months (N=2294) 
 
 Food Stamp 
Participant 
   Food Stamp 
Participant 
 
“Food 
Insecure”
   
Totals
 “Food Insecure  
  With Hunger” 
   
Totals
 yes no        yes       no  
      yes 349 
(15.2%) 
549 
(23.9%) 
898 
(39.1%) 
             yes 100 
(4.4%) 
150 
(6.5%) 
250 
(10.9%) 
 
       no 
 
351 
(15.3%) 
 
1045 
(45.6%) 
 
1396 
(60.9%) 
              
            no 
 
600 
(26.2%) 
 
1444 
(62.9%) 
 
2044 
(89.1%) 
   Totals 700 1594 N=2294           Totals 700 1594 N=2294 
 (30.5%) (69.5%)    (30.5%) (69.5%)  
 
 
 
C. 30-Day Measures (N=2707) 
 
 Food Stamp 
Participant 
   Food Stamp 
Participant 
 
“Food 
Insecure”
   
Totals
 “Food Insecure  
  With Hunger” 
   
Totals
 yes no        yes       no  
         
      yes 178 
(6.6%) 
251 
(9.3%) 
429 
(15.8%) 
             yes NA  NA NA 
 
       no 
 
767 
(28.3%) 
 
1511 
(55.8%) 
 
2278 
(84.2%) 
              
            no 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
NA 
         
   Totals 945 1762 N=2707           Totals 945 1762 N=2707 
 (34.9%) (65.1%)    (34.9%) (65.1%)  
 
   NA = not available 
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D. Single Parent Households (N=1514) 
 
 Food Stamp 
Participant 
   Food Stamp 
Participant 
 
“Food 
Insecure”
   
Totals
 “Food Insecure  
  With Hunger” 
   
Totals
 yes no        yes       no  
      yes 421 
(27.8%) 
277 
(18.3%) 
698 
(46.1%) 
             yes 135 
(8.9%) 
84 
(5.5%) 
219 
(14.5%) 
 
       no 
 
379 
(25.0%) 
 
437 
(28.9%) 
 
816 
(53.9%) 
              
            no 
 
665 
(43.9%) 
 
630 
(41.6%) 
 
1295 
(85.5%) 
   Totals 800 714 N=1514           Totals 800 714 N=1514 
 (52.8%) (47.2%)    (52.8%) (47.2%)  
 
 
 
 
E. Households with Incomes Below 50% of Poverty Line (N = 696) 
 
 Food Stamp 
Participant 
   Food Stamp 
Participant 
 
“Food 
Insecure”
   
Totals
 “Food Insecure  
  With Hunger” 
   
Totals
 yes no        yes       no  
      yes 226 
(27.8%) 
83 
(18.3%) 
309 
(44.4%) 
             yes 68 
(9.8%) 
23 
(3.3%) 
91 
(13.1%) 
 
       no 
 
215 
(25.0%) 
 
172 
(28.9%) 
 
387 
(55.6%) 
              
            no 
 
373 
(53.6%) 
 
232 
(33.3%) 
 
605 
(86.9%) 
   Totals 441 255 N=696           Totals 441 255 N=696 
 (63.4%) (36.6%)    (63.4%) (36.6%)  
 
 
 
 
